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A brief glance at the current issue of The Colonial 
Lawyer will show that the Lawyer's format, content, 
and focus has taken on a new direction aimed at 
serving the students, faculty, and alumni. 
It has been painfully apparent in the last few years 
that a change was long overdue. Some changes in the 
right direction were made in the Spring 1976 issue, but 
my staff and I felt that more were needed. After some 
consultation and deliberation, we determined that a 
student publication aimed at providing a liason 
between students, alumni, and faculty would provide 
the essential "raison d'être". 
But more than just a dedicated editorial staff is 
needed in order to achieve the desired goal. To be 
a lasting success, The Colonial Lawyer needs full 
cooperation, support, and contributions from all of 
you, our readers: students, alumni, and faculty. 
So you immediately say, "What does The Colonial 
Lawyer offer me?" And 1 say, "A lot!" For example, it 
provides a forum of general circulation for your ideas, 
as well as a means of receiving informed feedback. But 
that's not all. In particular, the students, alumni, and 
faculty have a chance to publish many different types 
of material in the Lawyer: short articles on legal issues 
or topics, short stories, poems, cartoons, and other 
items of general appeal. Moreover, the alumni get to 
communicate to other members of the Marshall-
Wythe community their recent achievements, honors, 
distinctions, and newsworthy events. And the faculty 
has an outlet for their views on current law school 
programs, teaching methods or materials, and 
innovations in legal education; as well as their views 
on various controversial legal issues. 
Of course, I have not outlined all of the services 
that The Colonial Lawyer can provide its readers. The 
ones noted above are only a few. But it must be 
remembered that the editorial staff cannot do the job 
alone. So PLEASE CONTRIBUTE, so that all of us can 
receive the most that The Colonial Lawyer can give. 
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RHETTA M. DANIEL, the current Editor- in-
chief of The Colonial Lawyer, received a B.A. degree 
in English from the College of William and Mary in 
1973. During her senior year, she was a member of 
Kappa Delta Pi Honor Society. 
Following her graduation, Ms. Daniel taught 
English, speech and drama at King William High 
School, and in 1974 she returned to the College to 
work on her law degree. 
Ms. Daniel is presently a Juris Doctor candidate at 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law and expects to 
graduate May 15, 1977. While at Marshall-Wythe, she 
has been a member of the Student Bar Association, 
American Bar Association, Mary and William Law 
Society, and the staff of The Colonial Lawyer. She is 
also a member of the Publications Council of the 
College of William and Mary and of the Society for 
Collegiate Journalists. 
in addition to her law school activities, Ms. 
Daniel has been employed as a law clerk and as the 
Legal Assistant to the Vice President for Business 
Affairs at the College of William and Mary. She lives in 
West Point, Virginia, has two teenage children, and 
plans to practice in the Richmond metropolitan area 
following her graduation from Marshall-Wythe. 
STAFF 
Top: From the Left - Carol Hill, Bob Harris, Cyndie Baskett. 
Bottom: From the Left - Teresa McBride, Steve Ormond, Rhetta 
Daniel, Victor Neubaum, William Batts. 
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OYEZ, OYEZ 
NEW FEATURES have been included in this issue: 
prose, poetry, humor, and alumni news. Many thanks 
go out to those who submitted material for these 
features. 
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE ALUMNI are par-
ticularly desired for the next issue of The Colonial 
Lawyer. Please send your news, articles suitable for 
publication, and monetary contributions so The 
Colonial Lawyer can continue to function as a liason 
between the alumni and the law school. Plans for next 
year include an additional feature spotlighting distin-
guished alumni with significant achievements in legal, 
political, and other fields of endeavor. 
THE COLONIAL LAWYER has its own office, 
mailing address, and telephone number. The office is 
located next door to the law school in 104 Rogers Hall. 
Our mailing address is The Colonial Lawyer, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, Va. 23185, and our telephone number is 
1-804-253-4686. 
Please send all correspondence to the above 
address and make out any checks of contribution to 
The Colonial Lawyer. 
SPECIAL THANKS go out to the Law School 
Association for their gift of $200.00 to The Colonial 
Lawyer and to the individual members of the alumni 
who sent in their monetary contributions. Without this 
type of support from the alumni, The Colonial Lawyer 
cannot serve this segment of the Marshall-Wythe 
community as only student issues may be funded with 
the money allotted by The Publications Council. 
CLINICAL EDUCATION is a new program added to 
the curriculum at Marshall-Wythe this year. John Levy 
is the Director of Clinical Education and the author of 
the article on the program included in this issue of The 
Colonial Lawyer. 
Contrary to the national trend, 2369 APPLICA-
TIONS FOR ADMISSION have been received to 
date for 150 places in the Fall 1977 first-year class. 
COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES for the Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, The College of William and 
Mary, are scheduled for 2 p.m. on Sunday, May 15, 
1977 in the Phi Beta Kappa Hall auditorium. There are 
148 candidates for graduation. 
THE FOLLOWING VISITING PROFESSORS will 
be at Marshall-Wythe School of Law next year: 
1. Professor Delmar Karlen of New York Univer-
sity, Tazewell Taylor professor, will teach Civil 
Procedure. Professor Karlen is a former 
director of the Institute of judicial Adminis-
tration. 
2. Judge Walter Hoffman, Tazewell Taylor Pro-
fessor of Law, will teach a course in Federal 
Courts. Judge Hoffman is presently director of 
the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, 
D.C. 	 He is a former member of the 
Marshall-Wythe faculty. 
3. Justice Paul Reardon, recently retired from the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, will 
teach in the spring semester. Justice Reardon, 
immediate past president of the Institute of 
Judicial Administration, will teach Judicial 
Administration and will lecture on Fair Trial-
Free Press. 
4. Professor J. Rodney Johnson of the University 
of Richmond is a graduate of Marshall-Wythe 
and a former member of its faculty. He will 
teach Trusts and Estates during the fall and 
spring semesters. 
5. Professor John Bridge of Exeter University, 
who has taught at our Exeter Summer program 
for several years, will exchange for the 1977-78 
academic year with Professor Walter Williams. 
He will teach International Law and a course in 
the European Common Market. 
CYNDIE BASKETT, a rising second-year student 
from Virginia Beach, has been appointed to the 
position of EDITOR-IN-CHIEF of The Colonial Lawyer 
for the year 1977-78. Her father, William C. Baskett, is 
an alumnus of Marshall-Wythe and a director of the 
William and Mary Law School Association. 
OYEZ, OYEZ 
Construction of THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE 
COURTS is progressing rapidly. The new center is located 
adjacent to the site under preparation for the new Marshall-
Wythe School of Law building. The locating of the National 
Center for State Courts next to the Marshall-Wythe law school 
site in Williamsburg promises mutual benefits to both National 
Center and Marshall-Wythe School of Law community. 
SITE PREPARATION FOR THE NEW MARSHALL WYTHE 
SCHOOL OF LAW is under way. Groundbreaking ceremonies 
were held on September 11, 1976, and there will be no delay 
once the actual construction on the building is authorized to 
begin. 
THE NEW LAW SCHOOL BOND ISSUE is going to the 
Virginia voters in November, 1977. All Virginia alums, 
especially, take notice and VOTE IN FAVOR OF IT. Your 
support of Marshall-Wythe at this critical time may make a 
significant difference in the future success of the law school. 
OYEZ, OYEZ 
JUDGE SHIRLEY M. HUFSTEDLER, circuit judge 
of the Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals, 
will receive the MARSHALL-WYTHE MEDALLION 
from Dean William B. Spong, Jr. at a law school 
ceremony in Phi Beta Kappa Hall following the 
completion of the Marshall-Wythe graduation 
exercises. 
The medallion is awarded periodically by the 
faculty of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law to 
persons who have distinguished themselves in the 
legal profession. 
HOMECOMING COCKTAIL PARTY - LIBEL 
NIGHT-BARRISTER'S BALL. Students, alumni, and 
faculty mark your calendars and attend all three of 
these outstanding Law School events. The 
Homecoming Cocktail Party, complete with an open 
bar and scrumptious food, will be held after the 
William and Mary Homecoming football game with 
Rutgers University on October 29, 1977 from 4 'til 8 
pm. Game time is set for 2 pm. 
The Barrister's Ball and Libel Night are 
planned for mid and late March respectively. Please 
contact the Student Bar Association, The Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, Va. 23185 at the beginning of February 
1978 for additional information and tickets. 
A SPECIAL INVITATION is extended to all 
alumni who have not attended these events since their 
law school days. You won't be disappointed! 
Judge Hufstedler, after having served in various 
judgeships in California, assumed her present position 
in 1968. She is a graduate of the University of Mexico 
and Stanford University's Law School. In addition, she 
has received honorary degrees from a number of 
universities, including Georgetown, Tufts, Pennsyl-
vania, New Mexico, Southern California, and 
Wyoming. 
The Los Angeles Times has named Judge 
Hufstedler "Woman of the Year," and Ladies Home 
Journal has recognized her as "Woman of the Year in 
Government and Diplomacy". She is the author of 
several judicial papers and a member of the 
International Association of Women Lawyers. Recent-
ly Judge Hufstedler was also chosen to serve on the 
board of trustees for the Colonial Williamsburg 
Foundation. 
Last year the MARSHALL-WYTHE MEDALLIONS 
were awarded to former Special Watergate prosecutor 
LEON JAWORSKI and professor NORMAN ANDER-
SON of the University of London. 
Great 
Confi- 
dence 
% 
Some 
Confi- 
dence 
% 
Little. 	 No 
Confi- Confi- 
dence dence 
% 	 % 
Not 
Sure 
% 
Doctors 58 33 6 2 1 
Dentists 51 39 6 2 2 
Accountants 34 37 6 2 1 
Plumbers 25 49 15 4 7 
Architects 22 38 9 4 27 
Lawyers 19 49 21 5 6 
TV newscasters 16 49 24 7 4 
Members of local 
city councils or 
Boards of 
Supervisors 12 42 25 11 10 
• 
Law students who will soon be practicing law will 
be interested in how the public perceives the legal 
profession. The Virginia Bar Association, concerned 
about mounting criticism of lawyers, some of it 
flowing from the Watergate revelations, last year 
commissioned Peter D. Hart Research Associates of 
Washington to conduct a scientific survey of the 
attitudes of Virginians toward the legal profession. 
Approximately 600 Virginians, selected as a scientific 
sample of the population in this State, were 
interviewed personally in sessions lasting an average of 
45 minutes. The results of these interviews were 
computerized, analyzed and set forth in a 70 page 
report. The report was released to the press and 
discussed at the annual meeting of the association 
earlier this year here in Williamsburg by a panel 
headed by Dean Roy Steinheimer of Washington and 
Lee. 
The survey reflected that Virginians, by a wide 
margin (84 to 10 percent) agreed that lawyers perform 
a unique and valuable function. 59% of those 
interviewed said they would feel comfortable and 
relaxed in a lawyer's office and 21% said they would 
feel ill at ease, inferior and in fear of being taken 
advantage of. Virginians disagreed with the statement, 
"Most lawyers work only with businessmen and rich 
people and don't seem to have time for people like 
me," by a margin of only 53 to 43 percent. Yet they 
also indicated by a substantial margin, 74 to 22 
percent that "Once a lawyer took my case, I think I 
would feel confident that he would give me a good 
service as his bigger clients." And, also, by a margin of 
67 to 16 percent said they would encourage rather than 
discourage their child to become a lawyer. 
One of the significant factors weighed in political 
polls for incumbents is the level of confidence. The 
level of confidence shown in various professions and 
occupations in Virginia is indicated below. 
HE LEGAL 
AND PUBLIC 
When asked to suggest changes in the legal 
profession, the most commonly volunteered sug-
gestions were lower fees, improved quality of legal 
service, higher standards of ethics and keeping clients 
better informed. When asked to comment on the 
disciplining of lawyers in Virginia, 6% of the 
respondents said it was excellent; 29% said it was 
good; 24% said it was fair and 14% said it was poor. 
As to whether participation by lay members on 
disciplinary bodies would help, 38% said it would be 
an improvement; 15% said it would be worse and 31% 
said it would be about the same. An interesting 
statistic on a controversial subject within the legal 
profession showed that 46% of the Virginians 
interviewed said that advertising by lawyers would be 
a good idea and 41% believed it would be a bad idea. 
These figures represent only a smattering of the 
statistical information provided by the poll and much 
of that information is ambivalent. It would be fair, 
however, to observe that the present public perception 
of lawyers is such that legislative efforts to change the 
nature of the legal profession might receive public 
support or judicial decisions affecting the licensed 
privileges of the profession might be applauded. 
The Virginia Bar Association circularized the 
survey to its membership, its committees, and to other 
legal organizations in the State. It was determined that 
in addition to the statistical information reflected by 
the report it would be advisable to invite lay leaders to 
discuss the more controversial questions raised by the 
survey. Accordingly, in June the Virginia Bar 
Association convened approximately 75 lay leaders of 
a 
PROFESSION 
PERCEPTION 
WILLIAM B. SPONG, 
varied backgrounds from all over Virginia at the 
Woodberry Forrest School and asked for their 
comments on the disciplining of lawyers, lawyers' 
fees, specialization, periodic recertification, manda-
tory continuing legal education and advertising by 
lawyers. Jim Cox and Jeff Detwiler of Marshall-Wythe 
were among the law students who helped record the 
proceedings. 
The conferees were asked if present measures to 
discipline lawyers in Virginia were adequate to protect 
the public and members of the profession. The 
overriding response was that much of the problem is a 
lack of public information. There is a need to make the 
grievance process better known. Grievance com-
mittees should be made more accessible. A majority of 
those at the conference felt that the disciplinary 
process would be helped if there were lay participation 
in the hearings. 
It was generally agreed by the lay leaders that the 
public does not understand the basis upon which 
lawyers set their fees. Participants believed that the 
lawyer should take the initiative in discussing fees at 
the first conference with the client, and that 
uncertainty over the amount can intimidate pro-
spective clients and lead them to seek help from other 
sources outside the profession. The conferees believed 
that the best method for charging was by an hourly 
rate with a full disclosure of rates at the initial 
conference. Percentage fees and contingent fees were 
condemned. It was suggested that many lawyers might 
reduce their fees if they could reduce their overhead 
by improving office efficiency. 
The conference participants agreed that lay 
persons lack the expertise to judge a lawyer's 
competence and that incompetency of lawyers must 
be policed by lawyers themselves. They did not appear 
to favor peer review or recertification, but did believe 
that mandatory continuing legal education with a 
requirement of more than attendance and specializa-
tion with certification (now being done in California) 
would be helpful. Also, there was general endorse-
ment of an internship period prior to licensing where 
both the ethical behavior and competency of the new 
lawyer might be judged. A probationary period prior to 
licensing is required in other professions as well as in 
some European countries. 
Supreme Court opinions in the Virginia cases of 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 [1975], and 
Bigelowe v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 [1975], were seen as 
combining restraint of trade complaints with First 
Amendment protection to presage holdings that would 
render unconstitutional sections of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility that prohibit advertising by 
lawyers. Suits pending in Virginia in the Eastern 
District were stayed to allow the American Bar 
Association to amend its code. The Supreme Court of 
Virginia has declined to adopt the amended code as a 
rule. Three different attacks upon the code are now 
pending in Virginia. At this writing it is difficult to 
predict the ultimate disposition of these. 
Cont. page 24 
William B. Spong, Jr., former United States 
Senator, was appointed Dean of the Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law, July 1, 1976. 
Dean Spong is no stranger to Marshall-Wythe. On 
two prior occasions, he was a member of the law 
school faculty: first, as Lecturer in Law, 1948-49; and 
second, as Cutler Lecturer, 1975-76. 
Dean Spong, a native Virginian, received his 
education at Hampden-Sydney College, University of 
Virginia, LL.B., and University of Edinburgh, Scotland. 
His past achievements also include serving in both 
houses of the Virginia General Assembly: House of 
Delegates, 1954-55, and Senate, 1956-66. 
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THE 1968 CONFIRMATION HEARINGS OF 
JUSTICE ABE FORTAS 
by Richard Dubin 
On June 26, 1968, President Johnson accepted 
Chief Justice Warren's decision to retire; "With your 
agreement, I will accept your decision to retire 
effective at such time as a successor is qualified."' The 
same day, the President also submitted to the Senate 
the nominations of Mr. justice Abe Fortas to be Chief 
Justice replacing Chief Justice Warren, and Judge 
Homer Throneberry, of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to be Associate Justice 
replacing justice Fortas. Arising near the end of an 
increasingly unpopular presidency and set off against a 
background of political and social conflicts which 
then divided our national culture, the nominations 
precipitated Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings of 
great historical significance. 
Throughout the summer, the Judiciary Committee 
held Justice Fortas' personal history, legal record, and 
constitutional philosophy before the most powerful 
magnifying glass ever used in such a hearing. For four 
days, Justice Fortas sat beneath the frequently warm 
reflection of the magnifying glass and testified 
himself. Essentially a conflict between well spoken, 
carefully organized advocates of judicial restraint and 
conservatism on one side, and poorly organized forces 
favoring liberal or moderate ideals and a greater 
degree of activism on the other side, the Hearings 
culminated in a failure of Congress to report favorably 
on the nomination. Thus, while it was reported 
favorably to the Senate floor by an eleven-to-six vote, 
the conservatives sitting on the judiciary Committee 
had gathered sufficient momentum during the 
Hearings that talk of a filibuster to block confirmation 
communicated the desired impact, and in September, 
Justice Fortas requested that the President withdraw 
his nomination? 
Situated in the final year of Earl Warren's tenure, 
the Hearings illuminate not only Abe Fortas' personal 
qualifications and legal jurisprudence, but function as 
a cogent manifestation of the idealogical conflicts 
which marked the Warren era as a whole. Considered 
in relation to many of the conservative dissents 
delivered during the turbulent development of the  
court's activist role, the Hearings provide a concise 
and distilled representation of the struggle which 
permeated this court's effort to define itself. A 
statement contained in Senator Eastland's individual 
views, filed as a part of Senate Judiciary Report, 
furnishes an appropriate introduction to the bitterness 
of this crucial struggle: 
Unfortunately, it is apparent from the nominee's 
performance as Associate Justice that he has joined 
ranks with those judicial activists who have become so 
overzealous in their obsession with the rights of the 
lawless that they completely disregard the rights of 
society; judges who have turned the temple of justice 
into a criminal sanctuary: judges more concerned with 
theories of sociology than sound principles of law. 3 
The argument about the proper role of the 
judiciary, as such erudite historians as Senator Ervin 
would tendentiously proclaim, is as old as the nation, 
going back to Marburg v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and extending through two 
centuries of judicial debate. But as Senator Eastland 
candidly stated, "This nomination cannot be con-
sidered in a void. It must be considered in light of the 
turbulent times in which we live." Given our 
historical perspective, it is still a serious mistake to 
evaluate Justice Fortas' Confirmation Hearings ex-
clusively either in terms of his immediate personal 
qualifications or in a vacuum of conflicting legal 
principles. Rather, the Hearings should be analyzed 
against the background of a nation trying to cope with 
the new realities engendered by the creation of a 
"Great Society." The Hearings should be understood 
in "light of the turbulent times in which we live; a time 
which witnessed the unleashing of great racial and 
individual tensions, spawned at least in part by earlier 
Warren Court expansions of civil rights. As Senator 
Eastland urged, the Hearings should be seen in the 
context of a widespread national concern that such 
developments as a rising tide of crime and prolifera-
tion of pornography signaled a disintegration of public 
and private morals. More importantly the Hearings 
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should be interpreted in light of the political climate 
these social developments helped create. Against this 
background, the Abe Fortas Hearings attain a symbolic 
importance. For in many ways, they embody the exact 
critical response to the Warren Court's active role and 
its social progeny which had threatened this court 
from its beginning. 
The deepest source of legislative concern 
throughout the Hearings centered on the historical 
debate between judicial activism and judicial 
restraint. Naturally, Senators Eastland, McClellan, 
Ervin, and Thurmond who formed the nucleus of the 
conservative opposition went to great pains, as well as 
length, to reassert the necessity of a judiciary which 
would remain subordinate to the letter of the 
Constitution. Yet, the factor which most fully 
expresses the political climate of the Hearings is that 
no one denied the validity of this theory. Perhaps 
because other issues put Fortas on the defensive from 
the beginning, he and his supporters did not attempt 
to justify the legal theory involved in an activist court. 
Thus when Chairman Eastland asked, "To what extent 
and under what circumstances do you believe that the 
court should attempt to bring about social, economic, 
or political changes?", Fortas responded, "Zero, 
absolutely zero."' The southern senators of course 
were unable to accept the proposition that a justice 
who generally sided with one of the most unrestrained 
majorities in the history of the Supreme Court could 
truly hold such a belief. Yet, consideration of the two 
memoranda adopted by the Committee majority 
strongly suggests that, at least in the case of Fortas, an 
apparent contradiction between theory and practice 
was susceptible to reconciliation. 
Exhibit 45, "Judicial Restraint in the opinions of 
Mr. justice Fortas," and Exhibit 47, "Memorandum Re 
Judicial Performance of Mr. Justice Fortas," were both 
presented by Senator Hart, leader of those forces who 
supported the nomination. The first document seeks to 
prove that Fortas' jurisprudence displays a respect for 
judicial restraint, while the second paper attempts to 
show that his decisions conform to such legal theory. 
Exhibit 45 is subdivided into three equal parts. Each 
part is preceded by a title which accurately 
summarizes its respective content: 
A. The opinions of Mr. Justice Fortas reflect a 
meticulous concern that the Court confine 
itself to cases in which the issues for decision 
are properly presented. 
B. The opinions of Mr. Justice Fortas reveal 
passionate belief that the Federal Judiciary has 
no monopoly on wisdom and virtue, and that 
the judiciary must show a proper deference to 
the roles of Congress, the Executive, indepen-
dent administrative agencies, and the states. 
C. Opinions of Mr. Justice Fortas reflect a 
craftman's aversion for absolute rules, and a 
profound awareness of the need to accommo-
date legal rules to the complexities of actual 
life. 6 
Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1966), 
and Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), are cited in 
section A as examples of situations where Fortas found 
the record inadequate for the purposes of reaching a 
difficult constitutional question. In Wainwright, Fortas, 
who wrote the majority opinion, Chief justice Warren, 
and justice Douglas expressed their view that the 
merits should not have been reached. In Rosenblatt, 
Fortas alone found the record inadequate for the 
purpose of a proper decision stating: 
Particularly in this type of case it is important to observe 
the practice of relating our decisions to factual records 
that serve to guide our judgement and to help us 
measure theory against the sharp outlines of reality. 7 
Section A closes with the observation that Fortas' 
meticulous view of which cases are judicially ripe 
provides the Court with "one of the most rigorous and 
consistent voices for self -restraint in this important 
area since the retirement of the late Justice Felix 
F rankfurter. " a 
In Section B of the memorandum, another series 
of decisions is introduced to demonstrate Fortas' 
conviction that "the courts must not impose their 
solutions to questions of policy either where the 
question was suitable for legislative remedy or where 
Cont'd. on page 12 
Richard Dubin, B.A. Colby College, Waterville, 
Maine, 1973; Candidate for juris Doctor degree, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, May, 1977. Home, 
Worcester, Mass. 
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Congress had manifested its will." In Steelworkers v. 
Bouligney, 382 U.S. 145 (1965), Fortas' first opinion for 
the Court presented a situation wherein the Justice 
expressed sympathy for the purpose of the appellant's 
suit but "declined to accomplish that result by judicial 
fiat. w Here, the question of whether unincorporated 
labor unions should be permitted to assume the status 
of corporations for diversity cases was characterized as 
"a decision suited to the legislative and not the Judicial 
branch, regardless of our views as to the intrinsic 
merits of the petitioner's argument." 11 In this section, 
just as in the preceding one, the greater impact is 
generated by a decision in which Fortas' assiduous 
restraint is set off against the more relaxed standards of 
his brothers on the Bench. In Federal Trade 
Commission v. Dean Foods Company, 384 U.S. 597 
(1966), a liberal majority of the Court headed by Chief 
Justice Warren accepted the F.T.C.'s view that "it 
should be enpowered to petition a federal court of 
appeals to preliminarily enjoin consummation of a 
merger under investigation by the Commission." 12 
 Writing for himself, Justice Harlan, Stewart, and 
White, Fortas argued that the Court should not make a 
grant Congress had frequently withheld: "The Com-
mission should not be given such jurisdiction by fiat of 
this Court. It should do what Congress intended it to 
do . . . The Act is abused where, as here, it is contorted 
to confer jurisdiction where Congress has plainly 
withheld it." 13 
Further evidence of Fortas' belief in the efficacy 
of a restrained judiciary is offered in the memoran-
dum's assessment of his deference to the role of the 
States. Here too, an instance of Fortas writing for a 
divided Court is followed with another example of the 
nominee's writing articulating stricter standards in a 
dissent from the more active majority. In United States 
v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 331 (1966), Fortas, writing for the 
majority, declared that the Small Business Administra-
tion's interest in enforcing its own rules did not 
override a Texas rule of law which rendered that 
enforcement more difficult. Despite his personal 
distaste for the coverture clauses attacked in the case, 
his strict view of the U.S. Court's role led him to write: 
Clearly, in the case of these SBA loans there is no 
"federal interest" which justifies invading the peculiar 
local jurisdiciton of these States, in disregard of their 
laws, and of subtleties reflected by the differences in the 
laws of the various States which generally reflect 
important and carefully evolved state arrangements 
designed to serve multiple purposes. id 
The memorandum describes Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145 (1968), as an even more persuasive 
manifestation of Fortas' solicitude for the rights of the 
states. In this case, Fortas concurred in the Court's 
judgement that the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment obligates the state to accord 
the right to jury trial in prosecutions for serious 
offenses. But he did not agree with the Court's 
implication that by holding that due process requires  
the state to accord jury trial for all but petty offenses, 
"we automatically import all of the ancilliary rules 
which have been or may hereafter be developed 
incidental to the right to jury trial in the federal 
courts ." 15 Concern for the states' right to experiment is 
clearly revealed. In Fortas' interpretation of the 
Constitution, a "federal union not a monolith" is set 
up, and insofar as the loftiest standards of due process 
will allow, the judiciary should allow "maximum 
opportunity for diversity" and attach "minimal 
imposition of uniformity of method and detail upon 
the states."16  
Duncan v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), is 
crucial because, like several cases discussed above, it 
consists of four separate opinions which give tangible 
form to the spectrum of constitutional philosophies 
which characterized the Warren Court. At one 
extreme, Justices Black and Douglas offer their 
familiar argument that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to 
the states. Justice White, writing for his Brothers 
Warren, Brennan, and Marshall, employs a more 
restrained selective incorporation procedure. Justice 
White finds that because trial by jury is fundamental to 
the American scheme of justice, the Due Process 
Clause incorporates that part of the Sixth Amendment 
which requires trial by jury in federal criminal cases. At 
the other extreme, Justice Harlan, joined by Justice 
Stewart, rejects the internal logic of incorporation. He 
delineates a more discriminating method of due 
process adjudication which entails a gradual process 
of judicial infusion and exclusion. This approach seeks 
with "due recognition of constitutional tolerance for 
state experimentation and disparity, to ascertain those 
immutable principles . . . of free government which no 
member of the Union may disregard." 17 Justice Harlan 
Cont'd. on page 21 
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REFRESHING 
RECOLLECTION 
Class of '29 
Judge Walter E. Hoffman, senior judge for the 
Eastern District of Virginia and Director of the Federal 
Judicial Center, will be teaching at Marshall-Wythe in 
1977-78 as a visiting Tazewell-Taylor Professor of Law. 
Class of '48 
For the past 15 years, Ira Bernard Dworkin has 
been honored by being listed in "Who's Who in the 
East." He has served as Vice President of his local bar 
association, trial counsel for the state child-welfare 
agency and Acting Magistrate of Hunterdon County. 
Presently, he is a referee on the New Jersey Worker's 
Compensation Bench and conducts a private practice 
limited to probate and real estate in Flemington, N.J. 
He also teaches an evening adult education course 
entitled "Sherlock Holmes Cross-Examined." 
Class of '49 
Walter Oden served as an intelligence officer for 
the C.I.A. from 1952-72 in various Far East countries. 
He is presently the Assistant Commonwealth's 
Attorney for Norfolk, Va. and recently completed a 
two year investigation which culminated in 101 
indictments and the longest criminal trial in Norfolk's 
history. Walter resides in Virginia Beach and is the 
proud father of a four year-old, red-headed daughter 
named Georgette. 
Class of '50 
The first editor of the William & Mary Law Review, 
K. Harvey Chappell, JR., is now in the firm of 
Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent, and Chappell in 
Richmond, Virginia. He was one of the organizers, as 
well as the first president, of the William & Mary Law 
School Association. His outstanding accomplishments 
in the legal field have included serving as the President 
of the Richmond Bar Association; President of the 
William & Mary General Society of Alumni, 8 years on 
the Board of Visitors, 4 years as Rector; and Chairman 
of the A.B.A. Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary which nominates federal judges. This 
summer he will begin his term as the President of the 
Virginia State Bar. In addition, he is on the Board of 
Directors and General Counsel of Thalhimers Brothers, 
on the Executive Committee of the Crippled Children's 
Hospital, and an active member of his church. 
14 
Class of '51 
Bruce Lester was appointed judge of Division No. 
1 of the 6th Appellate District of Kentucky on August 
17, 1976 and elected to fill the balance of the eight 
year term in last November's elections. He notes that 
Virginia is not without representation in the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals composed of fourteen judges, three 
of whom graduated from Virginia law schools. 
Class of '52 
Robert E. Mellon has been practicing all phases 
of law in Waterbury, Conn. since 1953. He is 
associated with another alumnus, "Tocco" Sullivan. 
Their office handles criminal matters, as well as 
domestic matters, property closings, etc. He is married 
to the former Judith Baker and they reside in 
Waterbury. 
Class of '55 
Nathaniel Beaman III lives in Norfolk and finds it 
easy to keep up on the news at Marshall-Wythe since 
his son, Chip, is a member of the first year class. 
Class of '59 
Theodore Bliss, M.D. and Fellow of the College 
of Legal Medicine, is practicing in Norfolk. His main 
interest is in the field of medico-legal law. 
Class of '61 
Allan C. Brownfeld resides with his wife and 
daughter in Alexandria, Va. He writes a column 
appearing three times a week in numerous papers 
across the nation and participates in several other 
journalistic endeavors. He also is a consultant to 
several members of Congress and lectures throughout 
the country for Freedoms Foundation of Valley Forge, 
Pa. 
Class of '62 
Peter Haynes White is still on all four corners of 
White's Corners, Hopewell Jct., N.Y. 12533 or White's 
Corners, Wappingers Falls, N.Y. 12590. He is a 
merchant, and his corporation owns one store, a small 
mail order business, and the family farm. White is the 
chairman of the Beacon Merchant Association, the 
director of the Howland Library Restoration Associa-
tion, a Town and County Committeeman for the 
Republican Party, and the Treasurer of the Town party. 
He is currently the "designee" for County Legislator. 
Class of '65 
John Meagher is Minority Counsel of the 
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of 
Representatives. He and his staff of sixteen provide 
legal counsel, policy and technical assistance to the 
twelve Republican Congressmen on the committee. 
Another Marshall-Wythe graduate, Paul Auster, 
joined the staff last year as a specialist in foreign tax 
law. 
William Joseph "Tocco" Sullivan became associ-
ated with Attorney Robert Mellon upon his discharge 
from the U.S. Army. He served as Director of Connect-
icut's Vietnam Bonus Office for two years and is 
presently Corporation Counsel for the City of 
Waterbury in addition to his private practice. He is 
married to the former Mary Lou Christiana and resides 
in Waterbury with their three sons. 
Class of '67 
Jerry Jebo is a partner in the firm of Dalton and 
jebo in the general practice of law in Radford, Va. He 
is the chairman of the Planning Commission of the City 
of Radford and a member of the Board of Directors of 
the Radford College Foundation and the New River 
Legal Aid Society. 
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Class of '68 
Worth D. Banner is an associate with the firm of 
White, Reynolds, Smith, Winters and Lucas in Norfolk, 
Va. He recently wrote the appellee's brief and 
presented his first argument before the Supreme Court 
of Virginia. The trial court's demurrer was sustained. 
Richard H. Harding was recently made a partner 
in the 40-attorney San Francisco, Ca. law firm of 
Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy. The firm special-
izes in the practice of labor law representing 
management clients. Richard, his wife Sue, and two 
sons live in Walnut Creek and enjoy the northern 
California life style. 
Class of '70 
Bradley K. Jones served four years in the U.S. 
Army following law school graduation. He voluntarily 
resigned from active duty in August, 1975, was 
admitted to the North Carolina Bar by comity, and has 
been a sole practitioner in Fayetteville, N.C. ever 
since. 
Fred Morrison left the Army after twelve years 
service in the summer of 1975. He had served in the 
Army JAG and spent one year teaching Criminal and 
Constitutional Law at West Point. He is now an 
Assistant Professor at the McGeorge School of Law, 
University of the Pacific, Sacramento, Ca. He is 
teaching mostly criminal law related courses and will 
be promoted to Associate Professor this fall. He has 
four sons; the eldest, Bill, is a freshman in college at 
University of Pacific. 
Michael M. Collins is a partner in the firm of 
Collins, Wilson, Collins & Singleton in Covington, Va. 
Stephen R. Crampton is a partner in the second 
largest Vermont firm, Gravel, Shea, and Wright, 
located in Burlington. He has served as Director of 
Burlington Junior Achievement and Director and Vice 
President of the Vermont Epilepsy Assn. His family 
includes wife Susan, a practicing C.P.A., and two 
children. He would be glad to talk to any graduates 
about law practice north of the Mason-Dixon line. 
Charles F. Midkiff was recently elected Secretary 
of the Virginia Bar Association, Young Lawyers 
Section. During the prior year, Chuck served as 
Treasurer of the organization. In addition, he has been 
reappointed to the position of Editor of the Young 
Lawyers Section, Virginia Bar Association Journal. 
For the last five years, Chuck has been associated with 
the law firm of Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent & 
Chappell in Richmond, Va. 
George Wright has been a teacher at Monmouth 
College since 1970 and is in private practice in New 
Jersey since 1973. His is married and has two 
daughters. 
Class of 71 
After serving as a law clerk for the U.S. Court of 
Claims in Washington, D.C. for one year immediately 
following law school graduation, Nicholas J. "Nick" 
DeRoma joined the legal department of the IBM 
Corporation. He is currently a staff attorney, Office of 
Counsel, General Systems Division, IBM Corporation, 
Atlanta, Ga. 
Class of '73 
Ed Miller works for the Vermont state legislature 
preparing and amending legislation. He participated 
in the first impeachment trial in over 200 years in 
Vermont. He and his wife, Sarah, live in Montpelier. 
Class of '74 
David G. Altizer became a partner with Gillespie, 
Chambers and Combs of Tazewell, Va. on January 1st 
of this year. He is the proud father of a daughter, 
Carolyn Anne Riley, born on July 4, 1976. 
Kent R. Nilsson completed his Ph.D. in 
Economics and Finance and established a consulting 
firm for attorneys which prepares and presents 
financial and economic evidence. He is living in 
Charlote, N.C. 
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Class of '75 
Louis K. Campbell served briefly in the Army and 
then as Asst. Commonwealth's Atty. of Botetourt 
County, Va. Presently, he is in private practice in 
association with E. C. Westerman, Jr. in his hometown 
of Fincastie, Va. 
Stanley C."Clint " Spooner is currently practicing 
patent law with the law firm of Holman & Stern in 
Washington, D.C. He and wife, Sandra, reside in 
Alexandria, Va. 
Class of '76 
John L Carver is engaged in the general practice 
of law with a three man law firm in Belfast, Maine. He 
deals largely in criminal and trial practice with real 
estate predominant in the non-winter months. Anyone 
desiring information on the New England area should 
contact John, Blake and Hazard, Belfast, Maine. 
Richard M. Foard is engaged in the general 
practice of law, as well as the practice of patent law, in 
Hayes (Gloucester County), Virginia. 
Robert B. Goldman is a registered securities 
salesman with Shields Model Roland, Inc. in New York 
City. He is handling retail customers, including estate 
and trust business, as well as pension funds. 
Unable to find a job with a firm or government 
agency, Sharon A. Henderson opened up practice in 
Fairfax County using her home as her office. Business 
is improving every day and she's learning more and 
more about the practice of law that they didn't teach 
in law school. She's writing a section on "Marriage and 
its Consequences" for a booklet on Women and the 
Law in Virginia that is to be published by the Virginia 
Women's Bar Association. 
After graduation from Marshall-Wythe and pass-
ing the Bar in February of 1976, Everett P. Shockley 
was employed by the law firm of Frith & Pierce in 
Blacksburg, Va. In September 1976, he opened his 
own general practice in Dublin, Va., where he is now a 
sole practitioner. 
Sandra R. Spooner is currently clerking for the 
U.S. Court of Claims in Washington, D.C. She will 
begin work as an attorney at the Department of Justice 
in the Attorney General's Federal Clerk's Honor 
Program in the fall. 
In searching for graduation dates for this column, 
we discovered several discrepancies between the 
information supplied and our computer printout. 
Please excuse any resulting error and assist us in the 
next issue by including your year of graduation with 
your information. It will be appreciated. 
They thought it was murder..... 
by Andy Thurman, 
NOTE: A tag line is necessary with this tale, as 
with all others of it's genre. The characters may bear 
some resemblance to real people, However, this 
similarity is merely coincidental. Moreover, the events 
are the "stuff that dreams are made on". 
Lieut. Evers, Robbery-Homicide, sat across the 
stained wooden table from the young man and stared 
patiently at him. Around them vending machines 
hummed; the several other tables in the small room 
were newspaper-littered but empty. Yet there were 
many other men about; men in the hallway outside the 
room, men in the four adjacent rooms, and men on the 
wide stairway that ended directly in front of the one 
occupied table. Most of these men were in uniform. 
The two, sitting men were outwardly calm, but the 
tension produced by unusual events occuring in the 
very early hours of the morning filled them even 
though both were used to it. Lieut. Evers fetched a 
small, weary sigh, shifted in his seat, and spoke, 
"So tell me about it." 
"Everything?" asked his companion, whose name 
was John Quintus Smith IV. 
"Everything," Lieut. Evers tiredly replied. 
It was late at night, almost morning, and the 
campus was lonely and deserted. The small law school 
building was dark; only the library lights on the first 
floor and the dim shuttered lights of the third floor 
were on. The stairway inside the building was lit only 
by the etheral red glow of the exit signs shining over 
the landing doors. 
On the third floor the landing had been 
widened and converted into a lounge with several 
tables and vending machines. This room was 
brilliantly lit but unpopulated except for a single man 
sitting at a table facing the stairs with a pile of books in 
front of him. He was reading intently from a  
particularly mammoth volume with the legend 
'Constitutional Law' etched on it's spine. Although his 
clothes were expensive and clean, his appearence was 
dishelved; there was a light stubble on his chin and 
cheeks, his short hair was in dissarray, and he often 
took off his horn-rimmed glasses and bit the ear-pieces 
in frustration. He was an amateur criminologist and 
first year law student, one John Smith by name, and on 
the morrow he faced that most harrowing of all 
experiences, the Constitutional Law exam. He was, 
insofar as a naturally plegmatic nature can be, frantic. 
He had chosen the lounge to study because it was 
empty and quiet, yet, somehow comforting. The stack 
of recent newspapers reminded him of a saner, if 
equally depressing, world, and the constant hums and 
clicks of the coffee, soda, and candy machines kept 
him company. Only occasionally would another 
sufferer ascend from the library and chat briefly. 
Although the floor was quiet, three of the 
other rooms were occupied. To the left of the 
landing-lounge, Jack Riley, the third year law review 
editor worked in the journal's office. To the left of that 
room was the cubbyhole of the Women-in-Law 
Organization; second year student Mary Lee studied 
for her Trusts and Estates exam there. Across from that 
was the office of Constitutional expert, Thomas Jeff, 
who was up late diligently grading an exam. The last 
room on the floor, the office of the law school's one 
genuinely eccentric professor, Emerson Holmes Filler, 
was empty. 
John Smith's agonizings over Griswold v. Connect-
icut were interrupted by a step on the stair, and he 
glanced up. The strain of exams had taken it's toll on 
his usually unimpeachable self-control, for he allowed 
the smallest quirk of distaste to twitch his lips. Coming 
up the stairs towards him was Emerson Holmes Filler. 
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Emerson Holmes Filler was a legend at the law 
school. His father had been mildly insane, his 
grandfather a raving lunatic, and many of his col-
leagues and students felt that he followed in their foot-
steps. He was a tall, lean man with beautiful 
androgynous features and thick blond hair that peaked 
several inches above his skull and fell in monumental 
and skillfully arranged curls to his shoulders. He 
invariably dressed in exquisite three-piece suits, silk 
shirts and ties, and cowboy boots. He was one of the 
country's leading experts on Constitutional Law and 
was resented by his collegues and universally despised 
by his first year students, including John Smith, whom 
he cruelly tortured in Con Law between sips of 
Hawaiian Punch, reputedly the only liquid he allowed 
to pass his lips. He had had three heart attacks, 
although he was only thirty. He was vain, pompous, 
sarcastic, witty, and a bit of a boor. As he came up the 
stairs John murmurred politely. 
"Good evening." 
Filler did not respond, but his glance fell on John's 
open text and he gave a slight smirk. He walked on 
past John, bought a cup of coffee, and went on into his 
office. John paused for a moment, irritated by the 
professor's manner, but then continued with his 
studying. He had read but little, however, when Filler 
reappeared and said preemptorily, 
"I've spilled some of my coffee and need 
something to wipe it up," 
John was annoyed, but he looked about him 
helpfully. "This newspaper might serve." he suggested, 
handing some to Filler. 
The professor took it and started to go back to his 
office, but then he paused. "Studying for my exam?" 
he inquired. 
John nodded. Fuller hesitated, then turned to go 
back to his office. "I shouldn't worry about it too much 
if I were you" he said almost kindly over his shoulder 
as he went. 
HE WAS A TALL, LEAN MAN WITH 
BEAUTIFUL ANDROGYNOUS 
FEATURES AND THICK BLOND 
HAIR . . . 
The suggestion did little to allay John's anxiety, 
He studied for a bit longer before he decided that 
Griswold was completely incomprehensible to him. He 
determined to ask Riley, the law review editor, for 
some assistance. Ponderously he got up; he was a big 
man and had been sitting for a long time. Leaving his 
book, he walked to the door of the law review office 
and hesitated; he recalled that the one blight on 
Riley's record was a failure in Constitutional Law. As 
he paused, his gaze strayed idly down the hall. Filler's 
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office door was open and the room brightly lit. John's 
attention was caught by the odd position of the man 
himself; he was sitting with his head on the desk at an 
odd angle. Curious, John walked softly down the hall 
and stopped in the open door. 
Professor Filler was seated in his desk chair with 
his head and shoulders asprawl the desk top. His left 
arm hung down by the chair; his right forearm rested 
on the desk with his hand lying on the bottom of the 
page of an open textbook. John mechanically noted, 
exams on his mind, that the book was the Con Law 
textbook open to Buck v Bell. Over on a side table in 
front of the couch was an empty coffee cup. 
"Professor Filler?" he called softly. He went quiet 
for a moment, listening. There was no sound of the 
heavy breathing of sleep. Stepping gently, he walked 
over to the desk. 
Very gently John reached across to Filler's throat 
and laid his fingers lightly on it. There was no pulse. 
John stood very still for a moment, looking slowly 
around the room; then he turned and walked quickly 
to the pay phone in the lounge. He called an 
ambulance and the police. These officials arrived 
quickly and soon announced their verdict. Professor 
Filler was dead, killed by a massive overdose of 
hyoscine, a heart depressant and eye medicine, 
administered in his coffee. 
"Well," said Lieut. Evers, "that was very vivid, 
and helpful, I think you have a talent for third-person 
description." 
"Thank you," John modestly replied. 
"You also have a talent for stumbling across 
murders. Are you going to solve this one for me or do I 
have to do it myself?" 
"I would be delighted to assist you, as usual," John 
smugly countered. "Is there any way I can be of 
service?" 
Lieut. Evers chuckled, "Why don't you tell me 
your theory of the crime?" 
"Certainly," John began, a trifle pompously . 
"There are five possible suspects." 
"Five?" 
"Of course. Riley, Lee, Jeff, myself, and Filler. 
No one else came by me on the stairs, assuming 
my testimony is reliable." 
"True," said Lieut. Evers, "but suicide is unlikely." 
"Why?" John asked, mildly surprised at his 
companion's sure tone. 
"Poison is not the usual choice of male suicides, 
and almost every suicide leaves a note. 98%. The 
odds are strongly against it." 
"Very well," John resumed, "to continue. Motives 
for the four potential murderers: Riley, law review 
editor, failed first year Con Law and had to repeat, he 
hated Filler. Lee, second year female, had been seen, 
once or twice, in perfectly innocent circumstances, 
with Filler, and the gutter mind of the amateur 
criminologist like myself leaps immediately to illicit 
liasons and smouldering passions. Jeff, resentful  
colleague, upstaged in his field by a younger man. And 
finally Smith, first year student familiar with murder 
and police procedure who despised Filler and was in 
mortal terror of his Con Law exam. Opportunity: 
apparently the only chance a potential murderer had 
to do the deed was the brief period when Filler left his 
office to get something to clean up the spilt coffee. If 
Smith's testimony is reliable, which, of course, it is, 
then Smith is out, as is Riley, who would have been 
seen by both Smith and Filler going to Filler's office. 
The other two are possibles. There you have it." 
Evers smiled. "Thanks, Sherlock. I must admit 
that I think I know you well enough to know that you 
wouldn't kill over a law exam" 
"Well," John considered the proposition, "I 
might, and I've never been a suspect before; but on 
the whole I'm relieved you think so." 
"Do you know who did it?" 
"I think so." John said, more seriously. 
"Well?" 
"It was suicide, of course," John smiled at Evers' 
outraged incredulity, "for both of the reasons you 
mentioned; the poison and the note." 
"Elaborate, please." Evers growled. 
"Well, poison is exactly what a man like Filler 
would use. I told you he was vain; he wouldn't want to 
mess himself up. But more to the point, there is the 
Hawaiian Punch fixation." 
Evers groaned, "Of courser 
"Exactly. If a murderer knew that Filler had a bad 
heart, which was common knowledge around here, so 
hyoscine would kill him, he wouldn't put it in a cup of 
coffee, which Filler reputedly didn't drink, especially if 
it wasn't on his desk. But what clinches it is the note." 
"He didn't leave one." Evers was confused. 
"Yes, he did." John flipped quickly through his 
Con Law book and stopped at a case heading. "Buck v 
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 S.Ct. 584, 71 L. Ed. 1000 (1927)." 
He passed it to Evers. "An interesting case. Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Filler's namesake, you know, in the 
opinion that was such a blight on his humanitarian 
reputation." Evers looked mystified. "Filler had his 
hand near the bottom of the page. There's a line there 
I've marked." 
Evers traced down the page with his finger and 
stopped at an underlined passage. He read it aloud, 
sudden comprehension in his voice. 
"Three generations of imbeciles are enough." 
"Yes, indeed, or so Filler thought: grandfather, 
father, and now him." John smiled in spite of himself. 
"You know, I'm inclined to agree with him." 
Andrew Thurman, B.A. in Classics, Columbia University, May. 
1976. Member of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, class of 1979. Co-
editor of the Amicus Curiae for 1977-78. 
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ABE FORTAS (cont. from p. 12) 
notes that such a strict approach was followed through 
the nineteenth and most of the present century. 
A review of the historic struggle to find the 
appropriate standards for defining due process and 
fundamental fairness is beyond the scope of this 
article, but it is sufficient for present purposes to say 
that the opinions of Black and Harlan depict the outer 
parameters of the debate. It is interesting to note, 
therefore, that Justice Fortas' opinion does not 
gravitate to either extreme, but rather stakes out a 
moderate middle ground. While the majority 
selectively incorporates and Black urges absolute 
incorporation, Fortas resists the trend of rigidly 
imposing the exact pattern of federal proceedings 
upon the 50 states. He concludes that such federal 
requirements as unanimous verdicts or a jury of twelve 
"are by no means fundamental--that they are not 
essential to due process of the law--and that they are 
not obligatory on the States."" 
Section C of the memorandum completes the 
review of Fortas' judicial restraint with an examination 
of his aversion for absolute rules. Fortas has given no 
comfort, the report states, "to those who hoped he 
would subscribe to the broad absolutes which have 
characterized many areas of the Court's work." 19 
 Rather, he has revealed "a subtlety and lawyer-like 
preference for moderate positions which have been 
wholesome additions to the Court."20 In support of 
this proposition, Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 
474 (1968), involving extension of the one man, one 
vote rule to local government, is cited. Here, Fortas 
argued that the Court should abstain from deciding the 
issue until the Texas courts had presented their "final 
product" for approval. His underlying purpose is again 
the rejection of a "rigid, theoretical, and authori-
tarian" approach to local government problems: 
In this complex and involved area, we should be careful 
and conservative in our application of constitutional 
imperatives, for they are powerful It is our duty to 
insist upon due regard for the value of the individual 
vote but not to ignore realities or to by-pass the 
alternatives that legislative alteration might provide. 21 
This aversion to overly simplistic rules, fashioned 
by majorities he sometimes found too unrestrained, is 
also reflected in the areas of criminal procedure, 
antitrust, subversive activities and libel of public 
officials. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1%8); and United States v. O'Brien, 376 
F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), are all presented as examples 
of Fortas' preference for moderate positions in the field 
of criminal procedure. Each case in the series involved 
framing approval of governmental procedure with 
carefully prescribed conditions. Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), is set forth as proof that in  
the area of subversive activities, Fortas entertained 
precepts "some might consider 'old fashioned'." Here, 
he declined to reach the constitutional issue raised by 
Black and Douglas, adhering instead to the majority 
view that Communists prosecuted for filing perjured 
affidavits "could not defend their false statements on 
the ground that the statute requiring such affidavits 
was unconstitutional." 22 
Thus far, discussion has centered around cases 
noted by Judiciary Committee supporters of Fortas, 
but generally ignored by his protagonists. There is, 
however, another body of decisions seized by the 
nomination opponents to demonstrate that Fortas is 
one of those judicial activists who, in Senator Ervin's 
words, "toy with the Constitution as if it were their 
personal plaything instead of the precious inheritance 
of all Americans." 23 This group of cases includes four 
categories which attracted special concern: criminal 
procedure, subversive activities, pornography, and the 
State-Federal relationship. 
As might be expected, Fortas' role in the Warren 
Court's pioneering criminal justice developments 
provoked the most vituperative attacks. United States 
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 
U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Derma, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); 
and most importantly Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), were typically credited with creating 
artificial rules of evidence outside the scope of the 
intentions contemplated by the original framers of the 
Constitution. In discussing these four decisions, 
Senator Ervin summarized the constitutional and 
social policy arguments leveled against Fortas' work in 
this area of criminal justice: 
These newly created rules are repugnant to the words 
and history of the fifth and sixth amendments upon 
which they are allegedly based, and permit multitudes 
of murderers, rapists, burglars, robbers and thieves to 
go unwhipped of justice. In the final analysis, these 
decisions rest an the strange assumption that society 
needs little protection against criminals, but criminals 
need much protection against law enforcement officers. 24 
Ervin's language has its roots in the belief that the 
maintenance of public order and the protection of 
person and property that it entails is a fundamental 
priority of government. At the time of the Hearings, 
the incidence of civil disorder approached previously 
unknown levels of . intensity. The Watts holocaust, the 
widespread riots of the summer of 1967, the massive 
unrest which followed Martin Luther King's assassina-
tion, and the violence surrounding the contemporary 
Democratic Convention all were etched clearly in the 
minds of Ervin and his committee allies. Moreover, the 
rising crime rates which every large city in the nation 
experienced reinforced the argument that the restora-
tion of law and order was a paramount concern of the 
general public. Thus, the basic complaint thrust 
against Fortas was that some of the decisions he had 
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ABE FORTAS (cont. from p. 21) 
helped formulate retarded this restoration. Following 
this critical approach, Senator Thurmond attacked 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because it 
freed a twenty-three year old man who had confessed 
to the kidnapping and rape of an eighteen year old girl. 
As Thurmond interpreted the five-four decision, it 
"completed the destruction" of voluntary confessions 
in criminal cases. Justice White's strongly worded 
dissent was carefully noted: "In some unknown 
number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a 
rapist, or other criminal to the streets and to the 
environment which produced him, to repeat his 
crime."' 
Fortas emerges as an 
unfortunate pawn caught 
between conflicting 
ideologies 
At this point, reference should be made to the 
second exhibit introduced into the Record by Senator 
Hart, a document entitled "Memorandum Re Judicial 
Performance of Mr. Justice Fortas." Here, the 
advocates of Justice Fortas directly confronted the 
criticism aimed at specific decisions. Since Fortas 
acted in accordance with a tradition established by 
Frankfurter and would not express his views about 
these particular cases, the memorandum furnishes 
what may be classified as a hypothetical justification 
of Fortas' participation in them. The memorandum 
particularizes "four relevant considerations" about the 
Miranda decision which the Fortas defenders felt were 
not adequately recognized by Thurmond, Ervin, or 
their allies. 
First, it is aimed that the extent to which the 
Miranda decision was a departure from existing law 
was greatly exaggerated. Chief Justice Warren's 
opinion for the Court is quoted to demonstrate that 
"the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an 
exemplary record of law enforcement"' while using 
essentially the same warnings required by the majority 
in Miranda. Additionally some state supreme courts 
had already come to the same conclusions about what 
Due Process required before the Miranda decision was 
handed down. In any event the memorandum 
continues, "When Justice Fortas came to the Court, 
Mallory, Escobido, and other cases had already been 
decided, foreclosing some of the possibilities that 
might otherwise have been open to him." 
Ervin and Thurmond also denounced the ten-
dency of cases like Miranda to let murderers and 
rapists "go unwhipped of justice," to put them back on 
the street without rehabilitation. The memorandum 
sharply disputes this assessment: 27 
The Miranda case itself and its three companion cases, 
Westover, Vignera, and Stewart, dramatically illustrate 
the aver-statement of the "need" for confessions in law 
enforcement. All four of these defendants have been or 
will be retried even though the confessions they made to 
the police are no longer admissable in evidence. Two of 
four defendants, Miranda and Westover, have already 
been retried and convicted of the same offense for 
which they were originally charged, and have received 
the same sentences originally imposed. 28 
Finally, the memorandum notes that, while the five 
man majority reached a decision on the issues here, 
the Court remembered its own role in our Federal 
system, and "specifically invited the Congress to enact 
appropriate legislation dealing with confessions and 
police interrogation." 29 
The reason that Fortas' record on the Bench was 
treated superficially and occasionally arbitrarily is 
enshrouded in the political mist which hung thickly 
over the Hearings. Out of this haze of conflicting 
political pressures, certain assumptions may be drawn. 
First, it seems clear that the Fortas critics were obliged 
to give expression to their constituents' dissatisfaction 
with the effect of the Warren Court's impact on 
American life. A primary concern of these critics was 
to act as alter ego for the public they represented and 
to articulate the fear and distrust of this Court's 
pioneering developments in criminal rights, obsenity 
adjudiciation, and other controversial areas. Consi-
deration of the scope of this criticism inexorably leads 
to the conclusion that this distrust and dissatisfaction 
was directed primarily at the Warren Court as a whole. 
Fortas' record did not lend itself entirely to 
inclusion in this broad object of attack, but the 
opposition was composed of men extraordinarily 
adept at manipulating political advantages. These men 
innately sensed a vulnerability in the Fortas nomina-
tion. From the beginning they seemed to realize that 
the rising tide of sentiment against the progressive 
changes wrought by the Warren Court would coalesce 
with the doubts surrounding the nominee's close 
relationship to President Johnson and afford them an 
opening. In this scenario, Fortas emerges as an 
unfortunate pawn caught between conflicting ideolo-
gies. He was not the judicial extremist characterized 
by the opposition, but since he was not the 
conservative, tradition oriented man they yearned for, 
he was castigated for his views. Fortas' judicial record 
may have warranted his nomination for Chief Justice, 
but other issues, primarily his personal history, 
provided the opposition with the seeds of resistance. 
Cont. on page 24 
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MERE RATIONALITY WITH BITE 
A law professor's warranty, 
whether express or implied, 
Extends to the student 
who has reasonably relied. 
To study legal writing, 
Torts, or Contracts, 
A student must do more 
than mere finding of facts. 
Who is this enigma, 
this reasonable man, 
Whose conduct we must emulate 
or act better than? 
Formalities of law school, 
"yes, sir " and "no, ma'am," 
Are not the best equipment 
to pass the bar exam. 
The library regulations, 
no smoking, eating, or drinking, 
Are effective preventions 
of concentrated thinking. 
In the dead of winter, 
amid sniffles and sneezes, 
All of us have learned 
about the loathsome diseases. 
Between textbooks and hornbooks 
supplied by Mr. West, 
With our Gilberts and Marty-Z's, 
most will pass the tests. 
Law school, however, 
is not as bad as it seems, 
For being attorneys 
is in all of our dreams. 
Cyndie Baskett 
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LEGAL PROFESSION (cont. from p. 9) 
How did the lay leaders of Virginia feel about 
advertising by lawyers? The report on the conference 
stated: "While there was a general reaction against 
aggressive advertising by lawyers to promote the use of 
their services.... , there was general agreement that 
much more communication and information was 
needed to match the client with the proper attorney to 
handle his particular problem and make the public 
aware that legal services are needed in certain areas. 
Present conditions leave the public in a state of 
ignorance...." There was no strong desire to see fees 
advertised, but the conferees did believe that there 
should be law lists available to the public that give the 
lawyer's name, background, experience, specialty and 
representative clients. 
Hugh Patterson, the Norfolk lawyer who along 
with John Ryan, an adjunct on this faculty, directed 
the taking of the Hart Survey and organized the 
Woodberry Forest Conference, has concluded that "a 
shroud of skepticism covers the profession." It is that 
skepticism that law students as well as practicing 
attorneys should understand. Has the nature of the 
legal profession and of legal education resulted in an 
abundance of practitioners who are insensitive or 
unaware of public concerns, or unaware of the 
professional restraints placed upon them in considera-
tion of the licensed privilege of monopoly? 
There is evidently a wide gap of understanding 
between what the average lawyer sees as his or her role 
and duty, and the public perception of whether that 
role and duty are being fulfilled. As much as we in the 
profession may relish the mysticism of our language 
and the elitism of our calling, there is an evident need 
to provide the public with information about what we 
do and why, where and how to select a competent 
attorney and to assure that the products of our law 
schools and those in the practice are both ethical and 
competent. 
The implicit warnings of the Hart Survey and the 
Woodberry Forest Conference are not new. In 1965, 
Justice Lewis Powell, then President of the American 
Bar Association, speaking on The State of the Legal 
Profession said: "The bar enjoys the privilege of 
self-discipline but along with this privilege there is a 
commensurate responsibility to protect the public 
from attorneys who are unworthy to practice." 
William B. Spong, Jr. 
ABE FORTAS (cont. from p. 21) 
These other factors were skillfully developed and 
eventually enabled the opposition to gather a 
momentum which made the inadequacies of their 
critism of Fortas' jurisprudence less noticeable. In the 
fall of 1968, the opposition reaped the harvest they 
had worked for over the long summer - Fortas, the 
moderate activist, was forced to withdraw. 
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Richard Dubin 
The following sentence was lifted verbatim from a recent recruitment letter: 
Again, I am looking for currently available applicants, law students, and people who will be 
graduating in May or June. 
"Yes, Virginia, there is a difference." 
	A 
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THE MARY AND WILLIAM LAW SOCIETY 
The Mary and William Law Society, an organi-
zation at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, was 
recently formed for the purpose of focusing upon legal 
issues and areas of interest which are of particular 
concern to the women at the Law School. 
Last spring, the Society co-sponsored the First 
Annual Virginia Law Women's Symposium ("Women 
Talking About Law: Getting In, Getting Out, and 
Getting On") with the women's groups at the 
University of Richmond and the University of Virginia. 
This year's Symposium, entitled "Sexual Assault: 
Psychological, Judicial, and Legislative Perspectives," 
is being sponsored by the Society and will be held at 
the Law School on Saturday, April 16, 1977. 
Although the Mary and William Law Society is 
open to all law students and faculty, the present 
membership is entirely female. The Society sponsors 
monthly speakers' programs and occasional social 
events to which all members of the law school 
community are invited. 
SALLY ANN O'NEILL, this year's president, is a 
juris Doctor candidate for May, 1977. She graduated 
cum nude from Elon College (North Carolina) in 1970, 
receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree in Social Science, 
and from Memphis State University in 1972 where she 
received a Master of Arts in Political Science. 
Sally has been working as a law clerk in the Office 
of the Chief Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Langley Research Center in Hampton, 
Virginia, and upon graduation, plans to practice law in 
Dallas, Texas. 
Amicus Subscriptions 
(LAW SCHOOL NEWSPAPER) 
The Amicus Curiae is now soliciting subscriptions for the 1977-78 academic 
year. Subscription cost for graduating students is $7.50 per year. The price of a 
subscription will otherwise be $8.00. To subscribe, complete this form and Send 
the detached version to the Arnim: Curiae, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 
Williamsburg, Va. 23185. Graduating students should drop off the form in the 
Amicus Curiae box in the Law School office. 
Name 	  
Address 	  
Amount Enclosed 	 Please 0111 Me 
	  
BLACK AMERICAN LAW STUDENTS ASSOCIATION 
The Marshall-Wythe Chapter of the Black 
American Law Students Association (BALSA) is now in 
its fourth year. BALSA is a small but diverse group of 
minority students dedicated to the development of 
professional competence in the field of law and united 
by two broad goals: the minimization of extraneous 
obstacles to individual achievement in the law 
program and the maximization of minority input into 
the American system of jurisprudence. Membership in 
BALSA is by voluntary association and in compli-
ance with guidelines established from time to time. 
Officers of BALSA are elected for a one year term. This 
year's officers are Wilford Taylor, Chairman; Bryan 
Milbourne, Secretary; and Carol Grant, Finance 
Officer. 
BALSA has been privileged to work with other law 
school and college groups this year. In an era of 
painfully limited resources, BALSA has stressed the 
necessity of inter-group cooperation and reinforce-
ment. We anticipate that this cooperation will 
continue. 
Realizing that the law school administration can-
not be responsive without input, BALSA continually 
strives to identify and elucidate the particular con-
cerns of black students at the school. Financial woes 
still threaten completion of a three year term for many 
of the group's students. Minority recruitment has not 
yet pushed black enrollment beyond the 4% level, and 
the absence of a black professor from the Marshall-
Wythe faculty does not carry positive connotations. 
These lingering, prickly problems will be tackled 
afresh each year until they are resolved. 
BALSA measures its vitality by the participation of 
its members. Consequently, the organization has 
sponsored or endorsed a broad spectrum of activities 
throughout the academic year. These activities have 
been characterized as "total law exposure on a 
shoestring." 
The year began with a picnic style orientation 
program for first year students. SBA and BALSA 
members fielded the neophyte's questions with the 
authority and finesse that are common among 
upperclassmen. BALSA's next event was a reception 
for William and Mary's black undergraduates. The 
reception provided an opportunity to make acquain-
tances and to identify prospective Marshall-Wythe 
students. In November, BALSA sponsored a topical 
symposium on the delivery of justice. Panel members 
included a judge, prosecutor, public defender, and 
academician_ In March, BALSA sponsored a day-long 
juvenile law symposium. The two panels of the 
symposium were comprised of recognized specialists 
in the field of juvenile law. The year's activities 
culminated with a farewell reception in April for 
BALSA's graduating students. 
WILFORD TAYLOR, Jr., present chairman of BALSA, 
received a Bachelor of Science degree in Business 
Management from Hampton Institute in 1972. While at 
Hampton, he served as director of a comprehensive 
drug abuse prevention program which was financed by 
a grant from the U.S. Office of Education. He was 
executive director of the Hampton institute Crisis 
Intervention Center and Peninsula Drug Abuse 
Training Institute and received a certificate from the 
Drug Dependence Institute at Yale University. 
Mr. Taylor received a master's degree in Finance 
and Economics from the University of Richmond in 
1975. He enrolled in Marshall-Wythe where he expects 
to complete requirements for the Jurus Doctor degree 
in 1978. Mr. Taylor has served as a student representa-
tive interviewing prospective faculty members. He has 
participated in the post- conviction project and will 
work as an intern with the Hampton Commonwealth 
Attorney's office during the summer of 1977. He plans 
to settle in the lower peninsula area of Virginia. 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW SOCIETY 
This year the Marshall-Wythe International Law 
Society experienced its greatest increase in member-
ship since its inception four years ago. This increase is 
not surprising since the ILS has been extremely active 
this year. Ten lectures and cocktail parties have been 
sponsored or co-sponsored by the ILS, have increased 
the exposure of Marshall-Wythe students to practi-
tioners and scholars of international law, and have 
permitted firms, governmental agencies, and interna-
tional organizations to meet prospective future 
associates. 
This year's regular series has included discussions 
led by various distinguished speakers, a panel 
discussion at Virginia Institute of Marine Science, and 
lectures. The various speakers came from the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem, U.S. State Department, 
United Nations, private industry, CBS News, and 
Washington, D.C. law firms. 
Four officers have guided the ILS this year in its 
efforts to meet the interests of the William and Mary 
law students. They are Patrick McDermott, President; 
Wally Kleindienst, Vice-president; Tim McDormott, 
Secretary; Sarah Slesinger, Treasurer. 
PATRICK McDERMOTT, this year's president, did 
his undergraduate studies at Montclair State College, 
The Sorbonne, and the Royal Conservatory of Music 
and received a Bachelor of Arts in French. 
Mr. McDermott is a candidate for a Juris Doctor 
degree at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law in May 
1977. He will practice law with a firm in Hampton 
following his graduation from Marshall-Wythe. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW GROUP FOCUSES 
ON PUBLICATION, AND SPEAKERS 
The growing awareness of the necessity of 
balancing the technological needs of modern indus-
trial society with the natural and human environment 
has resulted in an ever-increasing number of federal, 
state, and local regulatory programs and statutes, 
ranging in scope from the management of the coastal 
zone to the protection of endangered species. These 
regulatory programs and statutes, coupled with the 
litigation which has resulted from them, have made 
environmental law one of the fastest growing areas of 
the legal profession. 
The Environmental Law Group is composed of 
students interested in new developments in environ-
mental law. The activities of the Environmental Law 
Group center on two major areas of concern. The first 
of these is the publication of the Environmental 
Practice News, a review of recent developments in 
environmental law written especially for the practicing 
attorney. The articles comprising the Environmental 
Practice News are written by members of the Environ-
mental Law Group and strive to present a balanced 
view of new legal developments in the field. 
The second major activity of the Environmental 
Law Group is the sponsorship of a speaker's program to 
promote the discussion of important issues in environ-
mental law. Past speakers have included representa-
tives from law firms, government, and industry, and 
often their lectures have sparked lively exchanges 
between speaker and audience. 
STEVE ORMOND, President of the Environmental 
Law Group, graduated with honors in 1974 from 
Michigan State University where he received a B.A. 
degree in International Relations. 
Mr Ormond entered Marshall-Wythe in 1974 and 
expects to receive a Juris Doctor degree on May 15, 
1977. His law school activities have included 
membership in the Law School Christian Fellowship, 
Environmental Law Group, and on the staff of The 
Colonial Lawyer editorial board. Also, Mr. Ormond 
has worked as a Law Library Assistant. 
CLINICAL 
LEGAL 
EDUCATION 
Practical Experience 
Before Graduation 
The student comes into my office. "Do you have a 
minute? I want to do third-year practice." For the next 
fifteen minutes we talk about the course requirements 
in Virginia for third year practice; what courses are 
offered in which there's a chance that one might 
actually practice in court; and what other ways there 
are to get practical experience before graduation. This 
scenario was repeated numerous times. It raised for 
me two questions. First, what law students and others' 
think is needed from legal education which is not now 
being provided. Second, within the realities of law 
school and law practice, what can be expected. 
The underlying issue has been there since the 
birth of law schools as we know them today and has 
been most often articulated as to whether law school is 
a trade school or a graduate school.' This internal 
tension has its genesis in the history of law schools and 
their struggle for both hegemony over access into the 
profession and a secure and respected place within the 
academic community3 The campaign to acquire both 
the monoply and respectability was long and hard 
fought 4 and appears to have left legal education with 
an innate hostility and disdain for those aspects of law 
which deal with practice. Legal education's position 
has been that most of those "practical" aspects must 
be left to the bar since law schools do not hold 
themselves out to be "lawyer schools".' 
It is my position that if law schools "do not hold 
themselves out as lawyer schools" then there is very 
little reason why their diploma and the final law school 
exam, i.e., the bar exam, should be the prerequisites 
for becoming a lawyer. If the law schools can or will 
not shoulder a substantial part of the burden of 
assuring that lawyers have at least a bare minimum 
level of competence to practice law, then there is little 
justification to bestow upon them the entire benefit of 
having a monopoly on the access to that practice. If 
By John Levy 
law schools are truly graduate schools, then let them 
compete in the intellectual arena with other graduate 
schools (e.g., political science, history or sociology) 
without the overwhelming advantage of holding the 
keys to the Kingdom of Practice. 
The debate would take on quite a different cast if 
the burden of proof was shifted from those attacking 
the citadel, to the law schools themselves to justify 
why the traditional entry requirements, teaching 
methods, courses and length of legal education should 
be the prerequisites for admission to the bar. The 
illogic of the burden in the present debate (which is 
often the case in movements against the status quo) is 
that for what appear to be unjustifiable historical 
reasons law schools now sit virtually alone in the 
middle of the road to the practice of law and insist on 
framing the debate in terms of convincing them to get 
out of the way or at least move over. This is, of course, 
a very natural conservative reaction, but "stonewall-
ing" is not an appropriate response. 
The traditional law school position set out above 
does not accurately represent most law schools' recent 
stance. They have in the last ten or so years focused on 
clinical education as at least a partial response to these 
challenges. In addition to the debates outlined above 
and the millions of dollars the Ford Foundation has 
funneled into clinical programs through the Council 
on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, 
(CLEPR), there are at least four other factors 
which I believe have given impetus to clincial 
education. First, the usual (and I think often 
inapposite) model of the medical profession is readily 
available. One would not want to be operated on by a 
surgeon who had never in the course of his medical 
education been in an operating room, or seen an 
operation, much less, actually performed one, but had 
learned how to operate by classroom instruction and 
then, after graduation, by the experiential method of 
performing operations and then (hopefully) first 
recognizing and then learning from his mistakes. 
Medical education has a large clinical component to 
deal with the needs of the practice of medicine and, 
therefore, so should legal education. 
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Second, the accutely felt need of law students to 
acquire some of the mundane skills and knowledge to 
ease their transition into the profession has combined 
with the malaise of the second or third year to create 
great pressure for clinical courses. The consensus as to 
the value of the case method after the first year fell 
apart long ago. In the mid-30s a survey of Harvard 
Law School students found that they thought the case 
method should be dropped after the first year! Jerome 
Frank posited that the case method's goal of teaching 
one to "think like a lawyer" could and should be 
accomplished within six months. 8 
Third, the social activism of the last 10 or 15 
years, laced with a dose of anti-intellectualism, has 
forced much of academe including law schools to deal 
with practical problems (or, if you will, reality). The 
legal manifestations of this activism such as the right 
to counsel cases9 and the poverty law-legal services 
movement," has opened up areas of practice which 
lend themselves to field work by law students in 
clinical courses. 
Finally, the theoreticians of the clinical move-
ment have persuasively argued that primarily (or 
perhaps, only) through a clinical or practical setting 
can a student acquire a deeper theoretical understand-
ing and examine "some of the most basic questions 
about the relation to the legal order of language, 
symbol, myth and social consciousness."" Theories 
such as these gave the Ford Foundation and CLEPR the 
rationale for providing the seed money for the clinical 
movement.' 2 
My short tenure as a law teacher and my 
experience in legal services programs working with 
recent law school graduates and their inadequacies, 
both real and imagined, has confirmed for me the 
need for and worth of clinical education. 
After graduation our students will be plunged into a 
welter of impressions, processes, roles and obligations. 
The most important questions they will face will not be 
concerned with the coherence of doctrine or the skill of 
case analysis, but with making sense of this experience, 
of coping with it, understanding it and growing within it, 
in the context of the particular professional role they 
have chosen to perform. The breadth, depth, and 
applicability of this understanding will be a function, in 
large part, of whether and how they have learned to 
learn. 1 3 
Clearly, there seem to be a great need by and for 
law students to "conceptualize the way in which they 
(as an individual) shall become working lawyer-profes-
sionals."'" The clinical methodology, i.e. the students' 
assumption and performance of various roles within 
the legal system and the use by the teacher of this 
experience as the subject and focal point of 
intellectual analysis, 15 provides the student a 
structured context within which he or she receives 
feed-back and constructive critical evaluation of his or 
her functioning as a lawyer. This will most likely be the 
only time in their professional lives when this is 
available to them. This process is both intellectually 
and emotionally challenging. 
The traditional subject matter of clinical legal 
education - interviewing, counseling, negotiating, 
advocacy, etc. - provides not only knowledge about, 
and practice using, much needed and desired skills, 
but the context within which very basic concerns can 
be raised. The learning which takes place in the 
clinical context appears to be on a different level than 
cognitive (theoretical) transmission of knowledge and 
ways of analysis. The clinical experience is integrative, 
in that substantive legal knowledge, analysis and 
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interpersonal skills all must be coordinated within the 
ubiquitous constraints of time. The ethical dilemmas 
which pervade the lawyers relationships with clients, 
peers, courts and society in general are experienced. 
The Code of Professional Responsibility's broad and 
sometimes inconsistant mandates are confronted. 
Choices are made and the student must live with the 
consequences. 
The advantages of clinical legal education are at 
this time mostly just possibilities. Law schools, even 
the richest, have a finite amount of money to spend. 
The student-faculty ratio which is a prerequisite for 
the learning experience described above, is not within 
the ability of law schools as presently structured. 
There is great pressure to expend resources and time 
on the study of the ever expanding body of the law and 
its concomitant complexity. The other side of the 
equation also presents problems. The present day 
practice of law in many areas does not lend itself to 
either student participation or controllable and 
meaningful educational experience. 
It seems clear to me that there needs to be some 
significant changes in both legal education and the 
practice of law. Law schools have started to respond 
by experimenting with new methods. The process has 
begun to try to find a creative way to realistically use 
the tensions between the academic and the practical, 
and the case and lecture method and the clinical. This 
process opens up exciting possibilities for ideas and 
input from all. 
It is perhaps obvious that the students who came 
into my office inquiring about third-year practice, left 
with some feeling of bewilderment. The exact 
responses to their concerns are far from clear. 
John Levy 
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JOHN LEVY 
John Levy, during the past year, has been 
Director of Clinical Education and Visiting Associate 
Professor of Law at Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 
The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, 
Virginia. Prior to this year, he was the Director of the 
Neighborhood Legal Aid Society, Inc. in Richmond, 
Virginia. 
After receiving his B.A. degree from New York 
University, Mr. Levy joined the Peace Corps and 
served in Nigeria where he taught English and African 
History in a secondary school. Following his tour in 
Nigeria, Mr. Levy returned to Syracuse University to 
work on his Juris Doctor degree which he received in 
1968. 
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